4 de Enero 2016
Será dictada por Olle Blomberg, becario postdoctoral de la Universidad de Copenhague, quien actualmente realiza una pasantía de investigación en el Departamento de Filosofía UAH.
La conferencia será dictada en inglés.
According to recent team-reasoning based accounts, several agents engage in intentional joint action if they each conceive of themselves as parts of an additional single (group-level) agent and then each proceed to do what they all judge to be best for that agent. These accounts, along with accounts such as Margaret Gilbert’s joint commitment account, are appealing insofar as they promise to make sense of the complex phenomenon of intentional joint action in terms of the conceptually simpler phenomenon of a singular agency or body. In this paper, I argue that this move fails. Participants who act to bring about the goal of an additional single agent or body need not see themselves as together performing one action, nor are they barred from intentionally and rationally deceiving or coercing the agency of other participants. I also consider how accounts of team reasoning can complement existing theories of intentional joint action.
Sala H21 (Cienfuegos 41, Metro Los Héroes).